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Devolution dynamis of Spanish loal government
Abstrat
Over the last few years, there has been a devolutionary tendeny in many devel-
oped and developing ountries. In this artile we propose a methodology to deompose
whether the benets in terms of eieny derived from transfers of powers from higher
to muniipal levels of government (the eonomi dividend of devolution) might inrease
over time. This methodology is based on linear programming approahes for eieny
measurement. We provide an appliation to Spanish muniipalities, whih have had to
adapt to both the European Stability and Growth Pat as well as to domesti regulation
seeking loal governments' balaned budget. Results indiate that eieny gains from
enhaned deentralization have inreased over time. However, the way through whih
these gains arue diers aross muniipalitiesin some ases tehnial hange is the
main omponent, whereas in others athing up dominates.
2
1. Introdution
The literature on the eonomi dividend of devolution, i.e., the transfer of powers from higher
to lower levels of government, has been growing over the last few years. Many fators have
prompted its blooming, among whih we may highlight three. First, in the ase of developed
ountries, the guises of subsidiarity, devolution and federalism have prompted its analysis as
a entral poliy issue both in the United States and several European Union ountries (Inman
and Rubinfeld, 1997, 1998). Seond, in the developing world it is at the enter of reform
eorts not only throughout Latin Ameria and many parts of Asia and Afria but also in
several formerly planned eonomies (Stewart, 2000). Last, but not least, analyzing the links
between deentralization and eieny has been always at the ore of publi eonomis, and
it provides the rationale as to whih benets ould arise from deentralizing in developing
ountries. As reognized by many studies sine Tiebout's lassi essay (1956), a literature has
developed that emphasizes the benets of politial deentralization and the ompetition that
it fosters among regional or loal governments (Cai and Treisman, 2004).
The literature analyzing the eonomi dividend of devolution in loal government enumer-
ates several advantages, although some downsides also exist. The early ontributions date
bak to the pioneering studies by Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972), but given the aeleration
of the global trend towards devolution that has ourred over the last thirty years some reent
studies have reassessed its osts and benets.
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On the positive hand, we may highlight that
the devolved administrations' ability to tailor poliies to loal needs generate innovation in
servie provision through inter-territorial ompetition, as well as stimulates partiipation and
aountability by reduing the distane between those in government and their onstituenies
(Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005). From the eonomi osts' point of view, devolved govern-
mental systems may have some negative eonomi impliations in terms of eieny and
equity, along with the imposition of signiant institutional burdens.
One of the most signiant eonomi benets that devolution may bring about is munii-
palities' produtive eieny. As indiated by Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire (2004), some of the
proponents of deentralization attribute their support for a greater transfer of powers towards
subnational tiers of government to their negative pereption of the apaity of entral gov-
ernments to deliver publi servies eiently (Klugman, 1994). This positive eet may work
through a variety of mehanisms. One of them relates to itizen mobility, whih eventually
1
See, for instane, the studies by Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire (2004), Keating (1998), Klugman (1994), Xie
et al. (1999), or Zhang and Zou (1998), among others.
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ensures a perfet math between taxpayers' demands and muniipalities' supply, thus guar-
anteeing an eient delivery of publi servies (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972). Interterritorial
ompetition at loal and regional level may also have a signiant part to play, sine it fores
governments to onentrate on the eient provision of publi goods and servies (Tiebout,
1956; Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004). Another mehanism operates through the advantages
that smaller jurisditions have to tailor their poliies to the spei preferenes of their pop-
ulations. Indeed, as one may derive from Oates' (1972) deentralization theorem, the larger
the variane in taste, the larger are the potential benets of deentralization. There are also
some arguments whih operate from a politial perspetive. For instane, if loal governments
have greater proximity to their onstituenies, this allows them greater exibility to respond
to loal needs and preferenes, and therefore eiently math the provision of publi servies
to loal demand. This proximity to the people also widens the sope for greater politial
and aountability transpareny. In addition, not only does it redue bureaurati omplexity
and inreases itizens' monitoring apaity, but it stimulates further eieny gains as eleted
representatives are obliged to be more sensitive to the preferenes of their onstituenies.
However, there are limits to the eonomi benets of devolution. Some authors even point
towards the dangers of transfers of powers to lower levels of government (Prud'homme,
1995). The main argument is that national provision of publi goods and servies may be
more eient than at regional and loal level. This would our under ertain irumstanes
suh as when eonomies of sale and sope exist, and/or there are diulties in assigning
powers in a non-overlapping way. A further example is where orruption may emerge more
easily at regional and loal level, and/or regional governments operate in onditions of soft
budget onstraints. It should also be pointed out that the devolution of powers to subna-
tional governments might inrease spatial disparities, sine the power of entral government
to urb inequalities is redued (Prud'homme, 1995). This point has also been forefully
made by Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2005), who argue that Peterson's (1981) balane between
a redistributive entral or federal state and distributive and regulatory loal and regional
governments an be perturbed by devolution. However, the magnitude of this limit is partly
subjetive, given that it hinges on the value eah nation attahes to reduing inequality among
its itizens.
2
Most of the literature, regardless of the partiular vision on whether the links between
eieny and devolution are positive or negative, stresses that more empirial work is needed
2
Most of these arguments are expanded in greater detail in Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire (2004).
4
(Prud'homme, 1995; Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004). Until relatively reently, the exist-
ing studies whih analyzed the question from this empirial perspetive were surprisingly
few (Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004). This laim was reently stressed by Rodríguez-Pose
et al. (2009) who, following Martinez-Vazquez and MNab (2003), indiate that although the
notion that deentralisation inreases government eieny seems widely aepted amongst
governments and international organisations alike, the empirial proof for this proposition
remains sant (Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2009, p.2041).
Most of the existing empirial studies are ountry-spei, although severals ross-ountry
omparisons have also been published (Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Zhang and Zou, 1998; Xie
et al., 1999). Some of the early empirial studies report positive links between devolution
and eieny (Akai and Sakata, 2002; Zhang and Zou, 2001). In other ases, relationships
have been found to be weak (Rodríguez-Pose, 1996). The number of empirial studies on the
issue has inreased sharply in reent times (Barankay and Lokwood, 2007, see, for instane),
although most of the papers are more foused on how devolution aets growth; see, for
instane, Lin and Liu (2000), Thieÿen (2003), Iimi (2005), Thornton (2007) or, more reently,
Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2009). Rodríguez-Pose et al.'s (2009) is partiularly interesting in
some regards, sine it provides a ross-ountry omparison for ve developed and developing
ountries (Germany, India, Mexio, Spain, and the USA) where deentralization initiatives
have diered greatly. Calamai (2009) also disusses issues related to deentralization and
growth (in partiular, they study the link between devolution and regional disparities in Italy),
whereas other reent papers suh as Silva-Ohoa (2009) deal with related topis (institutions
and the provision of loal servies) in the ase of Mexio. Therefore, the literature is rapidly
bridging the gap on the lak of empirial studies, with the links between deentralization and
eieny being explored from several perspetives.
In this paper we provide some methods to analyze the benets of enhaned devolution in
terms of loal governments' eieny from a dynami perspetive. In order to do this, we
present a methodology whose underpinnings are derived from the literature on the analysis of
eieny and produtivity using linear programming methods. Speially, our methods are
diretly derived from the (deterministi) frontier prodution funtion literature, based on the
pioneering work of Farrell (1957), and Afriat (1972) and niely exposited in Färe et al. (1994),
ombining them with the reent ontribution to evaluate jointly eieny and devolution by
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2009). We propose an indiator to measure whether muniipalities an
benet over time from a hypothetial transfer of powers from higher levels of government, in
5
suh a way that small muniipalities (under 1,000 inhabitants) would provide similar servies
to large ones. Our goal is to analyze whether these hypothetial eieny gainsthe eonomi
dividend of devolutioninreased from year 1995 to 2000, and from 2000 to 2005, and to
deompose the gains over time in two omponents in a similar fashion to the Malmquist
produtivity index (Caves et al., 1982).
We analyze this question in the ontext of Spanish loal government. Several reasons sup-
port this appliation. First, sine the passing of the Spanish Constitution in 1978, there has
been a relentless proess of devolving powers from national to regional levels of government.
As indiated by Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2009), regional pressures, espeially those by nation-
alist fores in Catalonia, the Basque Country, and, to a lesser extent, Galiia, are largely
responsible for this reent devolution of powers to lower levels of government (Núñez, 2001).
In this senario, the devolutionary proess was pereived as a transendent step for both on-
solidating demoray and reating a more widely aepted form of governane Rodríguez-Pose
(1996). Indeed, as indiated by (Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2009), devolution is also espeially
important in Spain from a point of view of inreasing stability and publi trust in government
after the death of General Frano, ontributing to the strengthening of demorati prini-
ples (Núñez, 2001). The magnitude of this devolutionary proess has led to a remarkable
inrease in subnational expenditures (Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2009). Speially, the inrease
of transfers to subnational governments reets their enhaned ontrol over funtions and
resoures. However, the hypothetial seond devolution, from regional to loal levels of
government, never atually took plae, at least ompared to the magnitude of the devolution
to the regional level. Therefore, one might naturally wonder why it did not our and, if it
did, what its eonomi dividend would be. Seond, Spanish muniipalities have faed tighter
budget onstraints sine the passing of the law on budget stability in 2001 (Ley General de
Estabilidad Presupuestaria), whih establishes mehanisms to ontrol publi debt and pub-
li spending seeking the objetive of a balaned budget. This law shares the spirit of the
European Stability and Growth Pat and therefore some of our arguments ould be valid
under ertain irumstanesfor other euro area ountries, where budgetary onstraints also
tightened up signiantly to meet the riteria to join the euro. One might naturally inquire
how these hanges might have aeted dierent aspets of Spanish muniipalities, espeially
in terms of eieny and its temporal evolution. Finally, the data on Spanish muniipalities
is quite rih. It is therefore interesting per se to exploit the database to analyze a variety of
loal governments' issues, given that its rihness is generally absent in other studies on loal
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government.
In addition, ompared to other European ountries, analyzing devolution in the Spanish
ase is also important beause of the impat of the reent eonomi and nanial rises on
Spanish publi setor deitwhih as of September, 2009, is roughly 6% of the GDP, whereas
in 2007 there was a surplus. Compared to other European ountries the senario is gloomier
with foreasts indiating it will take longer for the Spanish eonomy to surge again. In this
diult senario, the relevane of the study on eieny and related issues in the publi setor
gains momentum.
The artile is strutured as follows. After this introdution, Setions 2 provides the meth-
ods used. Setion 3 presents the data on inputs and outputs, while Setion 4 shows the results.
Finally, Setion 5 presents some onluding remarks.
2. Methods
Our methods are based on the seminal ideas of Charnes et al. (1978), who developed Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to measure the tehnial eieny of prodution. One of the
main advantages of these methods is their absene of rigid assumptions. However, an even
more exible approah is Free Disposable Hull (FDH) in whih the onvexity assumption on
the tehnology is dropped (Deprins et al., 1984). Our study uses this approah for both its
higher exibility and superior asymptoti properties (Park et al., 2000).
Although most ontributions dealing with eieny measurement issues in the publi
setor have used either DEA or FDH, some of them have also onsidered parametri tehniques
suh as Stohasti Frontier Analysis (SFA). Examples of parametri appliations inlude Deller
(1990, 1992), Deller and Rudniki (1992), or Hayes and Chang (1990), among others. However,
the number of studies applying nonparametri tehniques is muh higher inluding, Grosskopf
and Hayes (1993), De Borger and Kerstens (1996b), De Borger et al. (1994), Hughes and
Edwards (2000), Prieto and Zofío (2001), Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007, 2009), Giménez and
Prior (2007), among many others. The hoie of method, however, is not always easy. As
suggested by Berger and Humphrey (1997) when inquiring whether a best frontier method
exists, the lak of agreement among researhers regarding a preferred frontier model at present
boils down to a dierene of opinion regarding the lesser of evils. Namely, the parametri
approahes impose a partiular funtional form that presupposes the shape of the frontier,
whereas nonparametri methods impose less struture on the frontier but do not allow for
random error.
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We hoose the nonparametri FDH method for a variety of reasons. As ommented on
above, this would inlude its muh higher exibility and its superior asymptoti properties,
not only ompared to parametri methods but also ompared to other popular nonparametri
methods suh as DEAunder FDH the onvexity assumption is dropped. Although the
minuses of FDH relate to its inability for disentangling random error, some rapid progress
has been made in this eld in reent times. This would inlude not only the bootstrap, whih
allows asertaining whether dierenes aross observations are statistially signiant or not
(Simar and Wilson, 1998), but also the emergene of other methods whih are muh more
onsistent with both FDH and DEA than with any other parametri method (Cazals et al.,
2002; Daraio and Simar, 2005; Daouia et al., 2008; Daouia and Simar, 2007; Martins-Filho
and Yao, 2008), and hene yielding omparable results.
3
We an also use some graphial examples to better realize the advantages of using FDH
as opposed to DEAi.e., the advantages of dropping the onvexity assumption. Figure 1
depits a senario for ve muniipalities (퐴, 퐵, 퐶, 퐷 and 퐸). For simpliity reasons, we
assume that only one output 푦 is produed (whih is represented in the horizontal axis) while
the vertial axis represents total osts (푇퐶). In this example, irrespetive of the onvexity
assumption, units 퐴, 퐵, 퐶 and 퐷 appear as eient in their respetive sale (say, they are
eient in the variable returns to sale, VRS, tehnology), while muniipality 퐸 is ineient,
sine it is possible to nd a less ostly way to produe the output level prodution 푦퐸. The
standard (onvex) VRS ost eieny model will show that it is possible to produe 푦퐸 with
a lower total ost than the observed ost for muniipality 퐸 (훼DEA×푇퐶퐸 < 푇퐶퐸). The ost
eieny oeient 훼DEA will show a value lower than the unity, indiating the perentage
of the observed ost to reah the onvex frontier.
In Figure 1 it is assumed than muniipalities 퐴 and 퐵 are operating in a entralized
environment (whih we label 푆1), while muniipalities 퐶, 퐷 and 퐸 are operating in a de-
entralized environment (whih we label 푆2). In these spei irumstanes, the onvexity
assumption auses a problem beause the point of the onvex ost frontier to evaluate unit
퐸 requires a ombination of units 퐵 and 퐶 whih ould be unfeasible beause they are sit-
uated in dierent operating frameworks. Under these irumstanes, the appliation of the
3
There are also some studies (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990) whih ompare the results yielded by dierent
tehniques. In the ontext of loal government this would inlude De Borger and Kerstens (1996a). Although
in some ases results are similar, in others they hange substantially, but this is usually beause of the
assumptions of eah tehnique (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990). Given the reent advanes in the nonparametri
eld, the omparisons would inlude, ideally, the dierent tehniques in this eld, omparing DEA and FDH
with more reent proposals suh as the order-푚 (Cazals et al., 2002) or order-훼 (Daouia et al., 2008) estimators.
We onsider this is a promising area of researh in whih ontributions are yet to appear.
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non-onvex (FDH) ost frontier oers a less ontroversial ombination: unit 퐸 is ineient
beause its total osts to produe 푦퐸 are higher than 훼FDH × 푇퐶퐸, a ost referene taken
from the existene of unit 퐶. In this simple example, it is worth mentioning that part of the
ost exess [(훼FDH − 훼DEA)× 푇퐶퐸] hinges exlusively on the onvexity assumption.
In a previous study Balaguer-Coll et al. (2009) present a methodology to ompare entral-
ized (muniipalities with less powers) and deentralized muniipalities (with more powers).
The main interest of their proposal was to enable omparisonin a non-onvex framework
of deentralized muniipalities with two referene points on the frontier, namely, one from the
deentralized sub-sample (푆2) of muniipalities and the other from the entralized sub-sample
(푆1).
4
Figure 2 depits a hypothetial senario where deentralized muniipalities appear to
be more eient than entralized when evaluating unit 퐸. As an be seen, the total ost
of loning the entralized muniipality 퐴 three times produes the output level 푦퐸 with a
ost frontier 훾 × 푇퐶퐸 higher than the ost frontier oming from the frontier dened by the
deentralized muniipalities (훽 × 푇퐶퐸) . Summing up, Figure 2 shows the senario where
deentralization eonomies dominate; under these irumstanes, the ratio between the ost
eieny oeients (훾/훽) will be higher than the unity.
However, nothing is granted in advane, as the opposite situation ould also prevail. In
Figure 3 we an see how the point on the frontier obtained by dupliating muniipality 퐴
an produe 푦퐸 with smaller total osts than the frontier dened by the deentralized mu-
niipalities (훾 × 푇퐶퐸 < 훽 × 푇퐶퐸). In this spei ase, Figure 3 represents an example
where entralized muniipalities are operating with a better level of eieny with respet to
the deentralized muniipalities. In this irumstane, the ratio between the ost eieny
oeients (훾/훽) will be smaller than the unity.
2.1. Temporal analysis
The evaluation proess represented in gures 1 through 3 has been developed in a previous ar-
tile (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2009). We now present a natural extension introduing movements
over time of the frontiers orresponding to both entralized and deentralized muniipalities.
Therefore, the question to answer is now dierent, sine the objetive is to asertain to what
extent dierenes in ost eieny among entralized and deentralized muniipalities are ex-
panded or ontrated between two periods 푡 and 푡+1. In other words, while in Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2009) a stati piture is presented, we now fous on sequene of movements, whih is
4
Here we will only present the graphial illustration to oer an intuitive idea about their proposal. Programs
[7℄ and [8℄ in Balaguer-Coll et al. (2009) dene the mathematial programs that quantify oeients 훽 and 훾.
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more omplex as hanges in time an be generated by a variety of auses.
Let us therefore assume that we have data orresponding to two time periods (푡 and 푡+1)
for the two sub-samples of muniipalities (those operating in a entralized environment, 푆1,
and those others operating in a deentralized system, 푆2). It is feasible to dene an index
evaluating the time evolution of the oeients presented earlier as follows:
훾푠2,푡+1/훽푠2,푡+1
훾푠2,푡/훽푠2,푡
=
훾푠2,푡+1/훾푠2,푡
훽푠2,푡+1/훽푠2,푡
(1)
whose value will be above (below) unity when deentralization eonomies inrease (derease)
between periods 푡 and 푡+ 1, respetively. If nothing hanges, the index equals unity.
This temporal index an be deomposed in a similar way to the Malmquist indies (see
Caves et al., 1982; Grosskopf, 2003). In doing so, we an determine the importane of tehnial
hange (frontier shifts of between 푡 and 푡+1), and eieny hange (onsidering the movements
in the distane separating the observation under analysis from their respetive frontiers).
Allowing for this deomposition involves dening two integer programming problems whih
ombine information orresponding to periods 푡 and 푡+ 1:
푂퐸(y푠2,푡+1) = min
휷˜,흀,z
휷˜푠2,푡+1
푠.푡. 휷˜푠2,푡+1푇퐶푠2,푡+1 −TC푠2,푡흀 ≥ 0,
−y푠2,푡+1 +M푠2,푡흀 ≥ 0,
z퐵 ≥ 흀,
−→
1 z = 1,
푧 = {0, 1},
휆 = integer,
(2)
and
푂퐸푠2(y푠2,푡+1) = min
휸˜,흀,z
휸˜푠2,푡+1
푠.푡. 휸˜푠2,푡+1푇퐶푠2,푡+1 −TC푠1,푡흀 ≥ 0,
−y푠2,푡+1 +M푠1,푡흀 ≥ 0,
z퐵 ≥ 흀,
−→
1 z = 1,
푧 = {0, 1},
휆 = integer.
(3)
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where y, TC , 휷 and 휸 have been already dened and 흀 is an ativity integer vetor denoting
the intensity levels at whih the observation taken as benhmark is onduted; M is a matrix
ontaining the observed output vetors for the entralized (M푆1) and deentralized (M푆2)
muniipalities; z is an ativity integer vetor having a value equal to one when referring to
the unit taken as a benhmark and having a null value otherwise; and 퐵 is a salar with a
large absolute value.
Having obtained these new ost eieny oeients, it is a straightforward proess to
deompose the index in order to dene the tehnial hange and eieny hange omponents:
훾푠2,푡+1/훽푠2,푡+1
훾푠2,푡/훽푠2,푡︸ ︷︷ ︸
Deentralization eonomies index
=
훾푠2,푡+1/훾˜푠2,푡+1
훽푠2,푡+1/훽˜푠2,푡+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tehnial hange index (푡푐)
×
훾˜푠2,푡+1/훾푠2,푡
훽˜푠2,푡+1/훽푠2,푡︸ ︷︷ ︸
Eieny hange index (푒푐)
(4)
The tehnial hange index (푡푐) quanties the observed movements on the frontier of
more deentralized muniipalities with respet to the hange in the frontier made up of less
deentralized ones. This index enompasses the relative shifts in best-pratie tehnology,
orresponding to the two samples (푆1 and 푆2) under analysis, between periods 푡 and 푡 + 1.
A tehnial hange index larger than unity indiates that the best pratie frontier of sub-
sample 푆2 improves more rapidly than that orresponding to sub-sample 푆1 (i.e., deentralized
muniipalities go through faster tehnial progress). When the tehnial hange index is below
unity, then the tehnial progress of the 푆1 sub-sample is higher than the tehnial progress
orresponding to the sub-sample 푆2 (i.e., less deentralized muniipalities experiene faster
tehnial progress).
One empirial example ould shed light on the preise interpretation of this omponent. If
deentralization provides exibility, and exibility favors the apaity to innovate in order to
do things better over time, then the tehnial hange index is above unity when deentralized
muniipalities demonstrate to having introdued innovations better than non deentralized
muniipalities have.
In ontrast, the eieny hange index (or athing up eet, 푒푐), shows what the hanges
in the relative ost eieny levels are, orresponding to the two samples푆1 and 푆2under
analysis, between periods 푡 and 푡+1. This index denes the distane of the observed osts for
periods 푡 and 푡+ 1 with respet to the frontier in period 푡. It indiates whether observations
in 푡 + 1 are loser to the frontier than they are in period 푡. When the eieny hange
index is larger than unity, the ost eieny hange between periods 푡 and 푡+1 shows greater
improvement for 푆2 (deentralized) sub-sample than for the 푆1 (less deentralized) sub-sample.
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On the other hand, when the eieny hange index is below unity, the distane with respet
to the frontier of the sub-sample 푆1 (less deentralized) inreases more than the distane with
respet to sub-sample 푆2 (deentralized).
Following the example of deentralization as a way to introdue exibility, the eieny
hange index is above unity when deentralized muniipalities whih take advantage of their
exibility are able to emulate the best performers faster than non exible muniipalities. In
other words, non deentralized muniipalities fae a kind of barrier to mobility that limits
their apaity to adopt innovations.
As suggested by Worthington and Dollery (2000), this distintion is important from a
poliy viewpoint, sine the hanges in produtivity growth due to ineieny demand dierent
poliies from those onerning tehnial hange (see Grosskopf, 1993). As Worthington and
Dollery (2000) indiate sluggish produtivity due to a poor eieny hange index would
require poliies designed to foster innovations. In ontrast, poliies designed to innovate
would exert its impat on the tehnial hange index.
2.2. Bipartite deomposition of the fators aeting the deentralization eonomies
index
We now turn to an analysis of the distribution dynamis of the deentralization eonomies
index, whih is generally more informative than summary statistis suh as the onditional
mean of varianeas it is impliit in regression analysis (Quah, 1996a,b), espeially when
multi-modality is present. Speially, our objetive is to assess the degree to whih eah of
the three omponents of produtivity hange aount for deforming the distribution of the
deentralization index between 1995 and 2000, and between 2000 and 2005, in a similar fashion
as Kumar and Russell (2002). We arry out the analysis by onsidering nonparametri kernel-
based density estimates, whih are essentially smoothed histograms of our deentralization
indies.
Our deomposition of the fators whih aet the deentralization eonomies index is
presented in Equation (4). By rearranging terms, we obtain an expression whih provides us
with information for period 푡+ 1 level of deentralization eonomies:
(훾푠2/훽푠2)푡+1 = 푡푐× 푒푐× (훾푠2/훽푠2)푡 (5)
where 푡푐 = (훾푠2,푡+1/훾˜푠2,푡+1)/(훽푠2,푡+1/훽˜푠2,푡+1) are the hanges in deentralization eonomies
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due to tehnologial hange (tehnial hange index), 푒푐 = (훾˜푠2,푡+1/훾푠2,푡)/(훽˜푠2,푡+1/훽푠2,푡) rep-
resents the hanges in deentralization eonomies due to eieny hange (eieny hange
index), and (훾푠2/훽푠2)푡 represents the deentralization index in period 푡. Consequently, both
푡푐 and 푒푐 impat on the advane of 훾푠2/훽푠2 . Both the eet of 푡푐 and 푒푐 an be measured.
The distribution of the deentralization eonomies index in period 푡+1 an onsequently
be onstruted by suessively multiplying the deentralization eonomies index in period 푡
by eah of the two fators, i.e., tehnial hange and eieny hange. This in turn allows us
to onstrut ounterfatual distributions by sequential introdution of eah of these fators.
Speially, the ounterfatual 푡+ 1 period deentralization eonomies index distribution
of the variable
(훾푠2/훽푠2)푇퐸퐶퐻 = 푡푐× (훾푠2/훽푠2)푡 (6)
isolates the eet on the distribution of hanges in tehnology only, assuming that eieny
hange is irrelevant. Therefore, the shift from (훾푠2/훽푠2)푡 to (훾푠2/훽푠2)푡+1 would be indued by
hanges in tehnology.
On the other hand, the ounterfatual 푡+ 1 period deentralization eonomies index dis-
tribution of the variable
(훾푠2/훽푠2)퐸퐹퐹 = 푒푐× (훾푠2/훽푠2)푡 (7)
then isolates the eet on the distribution of 훾푠2/훽푠2 of hanges in eieny only, as if tehnial
hange were irrelevant. Therefore, the shift from (훾푠2/훽푠2)푡 to (훾푠2/훽푠2)푡+1 would be indued
by hanges in eieny only.
As indiated above, this analysis is performed by onsidering density funtions estimated
nonparametrially using kernel smoothing methods. The literature on this topi is voluminous,
and several monographs provide appropriate in-depth analysis. Perhaps the most popular one
is Silverman (1986) although there are other important ontributions suh as Sott (1992) and
Wand and Jones (1995). The reent monograph by Li and Raine (2007) is a nie ompendium
of previous studies, with new additional ontributions.
The general kernel estimator is the Rosenblatt (1956)-Parzen (1962) kernel estimator,
whose expression is:
푓ˆ(푥) = (푆ℎ)−1
푆∑
푠=1
퐾
(푥푠 − 푥
ℎ
)
= (푆ℎ)−1
푆∑
푠=1
퐾(휓푠) (8)
where 푓ˆ is the estimated density, 푥 is the evaluation point, 푥푠 is the observation being evalu-
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ated (푠 = 1, . . . , 푆) and ℎ is the bandwidth, smoothing parameter or window width.
When estimating a density funtion via kernel smoothing methods, two ritial deisions
must be made: (i) hoosing the kernel; (ii) hoosing the bandwidth. Both aet the shape
of the density, but the eet of the seond deision is muh larger ompared with the rst
one and, onsequently, the literature devoted to the seletion of smoothing parameter is
vast. Regarding the hoie of kernel, several alternatives are available. The features of a
kernel are those of a density funtion, and thus, kernels are frequently hosen to be well-
known density funtions (Pagan and Ullah, 1999), for example the standard normal 퐾(휓) =
(2휋)−1/2exp(−.5휓2), whih was our hoie. Regarding the bandwidth, the methods that have
beome more widely used are the plug-in methods (Sheather and Jones, 1991), beause of
their superior performane in terms of balane between bias and variane ompared with
other methods. This was our hoie. In addition, they are quite onvenient given that they
are now implemented in several statistial software pakages suh as R.
5
We an also look at nonparametri tehniques to formally test whether the distributions
obtained in previous setions dier statistially. Speially, we apply the Li (1996) test,
whih analyzes whether two unknown distributions dier signiantly. Therefore, if 푓 and 푔
are the distributions orresponding to, let us say, 훾푠2,푡/훽푠2,푡 and 훾푠2,푡+1/훽푠2,푡+1, the testable
null hypothesis would be 퐻0 : 훾
푠2,푡/훽푠2,푡 = 훾푠2,푡+1/훽푠2,푡+1 against the alternative, 퐻1 :
훾푠2,푡/훽푠2,푡 ∕= 훾푠2,푡+1/훽푠2,푡+1.6
The test we use is based on the generally aepted idea of measuring the global distane
(loseness) between two densities 푓(푥) and 푔(푥) by the integrated squared error (Pagan and
Ullah, 1999). The integrated square error is the basis for onstruting the statisti on whih
the test is based (see Fan, 1994; Li, 1996; Pagan and Ullah, 1999). The Li (1996) test
requires some assumptions to be met suh as independently distributed observations in eah
sub-group, and identially within eah sub-group. However, our estimates are dependent
in the statistial sense, sine they have been obtained using linear programming methods.
Therefore, perturbations of observations whih lie on the estimated frontier will generally
aet the eienies estimated for other observations. Under these irumstanes it is not
lear whether the Li (1996) test will perform satisfatorily. Aordingly, we follow Li (1999),
who shows that the bootstrap provides better inferene than the standard normal. Simar
and Zelenyuk (2006) stress this point, indiating that in the spei setup of eieny sores
obtained using linear programming tehniques there is no real alternative to the bootstrap.
5
Inluded in the pakage KernSmooth, based on Wand and Jones (1995).
6
Some additional renements to this test have been reently proposed; see, for instane Li et al. (2009).
14
Therefore, we adopt Simar and Zelenyuk's (2006) proposal based on the bootstrap for adapting
the Li (1996) test to the ontext of estimates obtained using linear programming methods.
Speially, onsistent bootstrap estimates of the 푝-values of the Li (1996) test in its own
spei ontext are provided by:
푝ˆ =
1
퐵
퐵∑
푏=1
퐼{퐽ˆ푏 > 퐽ˆ}, (9)
where 푏 = 1, . . . , 퐵 is the number of bootstrap repliates, 퐼 is an indiator funtion, 퐽ˆ is the
statisti yielded by the Li (1996) test, and 퐽ˆ푏 is the bootstrapped statisti. These 푝-values
must be adapted to our ontextwhere the true deentralization indies are replaed by our
estimates from equations (2) and (3).
3. Data, inputs, and outputs
We use a sample of 1,164 Spanish muniipalities with a population over 1,000 inhabitants for
years 1995, 2000 and 2005. Although the total number of muniipalities in the database was
higher, the nal number of observations is lower beause we onsider only those muniipali-
ties with available information for the three sample years. Both input and output data are
provided by the Spanish Ministry for Publi Administration. The analysis is performed for
years 1995, 2000 and 2005 beause the survey on loal infrastrutures and failities (Enuesta
de Infraestruturas y Equipamientos Loales), whih provides information on outputs, is only
available for those three periods. Input data has been onstruted from loal government
budget information. In this ase the frequeny is higher given that data are available for
every year.
The seletion of outputs is based on the servies and failities provided by eah muniipal-
ity. Spanish loal governments must provide minimum servies depending on their number of
inhabitants. Some of them are universally provided, yet others are only a legal requirement
for larger muniipalities. These ategories are muniipalities with: (i) less than 5,000 inhabi-
tants; (ii) of over 5,000 and less than 20,000; (iii) of more than 20,000 and less than 50,000;
(iv) and over 50,000. Our outputs have been seleted aording to the list of minimum ser-
vies.
7
They inlude population (푌1), number of lighting points (푌2), tons of waste olleted
(푌3), street infrastruture (푌4), publi buildings (푌5), market (푌6), publi parks (푌7), and
7
See Balaguer-Coll et al. (2009) for a detailed desription of the minimum servies that eah ategory of
muniipalities must provide, and the output indiators designed to measure (or to proxy) the dierent servies.
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assistane enters (푌8). Outputs 푌4 through 푌8 are measured via their surfae area, in square
meters. We thus measure eight servies by means of the proxy indiators. Using proxies is
unavoidable sine, as pointed out by De Borger and Kerstens (1996a), population is learly
not a diret output of loal prodution but is assumed to proxy for the various administrative
tasks undertaken by muniipalities. The hoie has also been driven by previous studies on
eieny in other European loal governments for whih dierenes are basially onned to
the area of eduationin Spain it is ontrolled by higher levels of government. An interesting
feature of our database is the inlusion of information on the quality of the infrastrutures
and failities. This is measured using an indiator taking the value of 1 (bad), 2 (fair) or 3
(good). We have onstruted a weighted indiator of average quality, and it has been modeled
as an additional output (푌9).
8
The hoie of inputs is based on budget information, whih reets muniipalities' osts.
Three main ategories are inluded: urrent (ordinary) expenditures, apital expenditures,
and nanial expenditures. The rst ones ontain four further ategories, whih aount
for: (i) personnel expenditure; (ii) urrent goods and servies expenditures; (iii) nanial
expenditures; (iv) urrent transfers. Capital expenditures are also deomposed, falling into
either real investments, or apital transfers. The former is what the eonomi budgetary
lassiation labels as apital expenditures, i.e., all expenditures loal governments implement
either: (i) to produe or aquire apital goods; (ii) to aquire neessary goods to provide loal
servies in the right onditions; (iii) nanial expenditures that are suitable for amortization.
Capital transfers refer to the payments to institutions to nane ertain investments. Sine
we measure overall ost eieny, and all inputs refer to dierent osts' ategories, they have
been added to sum up the total ost gure, 푇퐶.9 Some summary statistis for both inputs
and outputs are reported in Table 1.
4. Results
The deentralization eonomies indiator should be interpreted as the gains that muniipalities
obtain over time (between periods 푡 and 푡+1) from fousing on a wider range of servies and
failities. Summary results are reported in Table 2, and they suggest that, over timeboth
from 1995 to 2000, and from 2000 to 2005benets are obtained from a broader range for
muniipalities with higher levels of powers, sine most deiles of the deentralization eonomies
8
The literature has onsidered multiple ways to ontrol for the quality of the outputs. See, for instane,
the early proposals by Banker and Morey (1986).
9
See Balaguer-Coll et al. (2009) for additional details on the inputs and budgetary lassiation.
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index distribution present values greater than unity. We provide information for dierent
deiles of the distribution, sine it permits us to understand more aurately the magnitude
of the deentralization eonomies.
10
Globally, these results show that, in relative terms, the
temporal evolution of deentralized (or devolved) muniipalities improves on the ost frontier
onstruted with the less deentralized muniipalities. The eet is not entirely mimiked for
the 20002005, when the tehnial hange eet still prevails yet to a lesser extent. However,
the empirial evidene is not enough to onlude whether a lear tendeny exists. Reall
that expression (4) breaks down the deentralization eonomies index into two omponents:
the tehnial hange index (movements of the ost frontier) and the eieny hange index
(hange in the distane separating ineieny units from their ost frontier).
Table 2 is a good example of the advantages of breaking down global indies, in order to
disentangle the extent to whih there are basi phenomena probably masked by exessively
aggregated indies. Indeed, the tehnial hange index exhibits average values greater than
unity, whih indiates that the deentralized best performing muniipalities have shifted their
respetive ost frontier more than the less deentralized best performers. On the other hand,
as the eieny hange index is signiantly smaller than unity, ineient deentralized mu-
niipalities have been unable to follow the pae of the innovators. Therefore, the innovations
introdued by deentralized muniipalities have a remarkable impat on eieny, but they
enounter a sort of barriers to mobility, whih hinders the spreading of these innovations
among deentralized muniipalities.
Overall, this is reeted in that the sope for improving the eieny of deentralized mu-
niipalities through innovations introdued by the most dynami deentralized muniipalities
grew from 1995 to 2000, and to a lesser extent from 2000 to 2005. Regarding the ineient
units, one the barriers to mobility are overome, they have a potential growth in eieny
and emulate the innovations introdued by the most dynami deentralized muniipalities. In
sum, innovations produing shifts in the ost frontiers are far more important in deentral-
ized muniipalities. The shifts in the frontier, however, are not mehanially translated to
the deentralization index beause there seems to be a problem in the spread of innovations.
One the problem of how to disseminate these good praties is solved, the advantage of
deentralized muniipalities in dynami terms would be unquestionable.
We now turn to an analysis of distribution dynamis of the deentralization indies, and
fous not only on summary statistis like those reported in Table 1, but on how the entire
10
For instane, a high average ould be yielded simply beause of the existene of outliers.
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distributions have evolved. Figures 4 through 7 provide the means to assess to what extent
eah of the two omponents of the deentralization eonomies indextehnial hange and
eieny hangeaount for the deformation of its distribution between the seleted sub-
periods and the entire 19952005 period. Figure 4.a displays kernel-based density estimates
(essentially smoothed histograms) of 훾푠2/훽푠2 for years 1995 (푡, solid line) and 2000 (푡 + 1,
dashed line). Figure 6.a reports analogous information for the 20002005 subperiod. Vertial
lines represent mean values for eah distribution in eah gure, i.e., solid line for the base
period, 푏, and dashed line for the urrent period, 푐. Both 푏 and 푐 dier for the dierent
gures. In Figure 4 and Figure 5 푏 = 1995 and 푐 = 2000, whereas in Figure 6 and Figure 7,
푏 = 2000 and 푐 = 2005. These vertial lines suggest that the advanes have been modest and,
therefore, we an probably onlude that deentralization eonomies have not improved over
time on average. A more extended graphial analysis onsidering the entire distribution and
not only a summary statisti reveals that dierenes between both distributions are not very
important, and therefore we an probably onlude that deentralization eonomies have not
improved over time. This onlusion applies for the 20002005 transition (Figure 6.a and Fig-
ure 7.a). However, for the 19952000 period (Figure 4.a and Figure 5.a) dierenes between
both densities are peuliar, as we ould onlude they are onned to being slightly tighter in
year 2000. The bandwidths for the dierent densities (obtained using the seond-generation
plug-in method by Sheather and Jones (1991)) are reported in the dierent legends. Not all
the legends have bandwidths, sine some of the gures are the same.
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However, deomposing the evolution of 훾푠2/훽푠2 into its two omponents (tehnial hange
and eieny hange) suggests the shift from 훾푠2,1995/훽푠2,1995 to 훾푠2,2000/훽푠2,2000 has been
generated by two opposite eets. Figure 4.b indiates that the fator ontributing positively
to its advane has been a tehnial hange omponent. The solid line represents the distri-
bution in Equation (6), whih isolates the eet on the distribution of hanges in tehnology
only, as if no eieny hange ourred from 1995 to 2000. Therefore, the nal (year 2000)
distribution would be represented by the solid line. Vertial lines indiate the mean values for
both distributions (훾푠2,1995/훽푠2,1995 and (훾푠2/훽푠2)푇퐸퐶퐻 = 푡푐× (훾푠2/훽푠2)1995, respetively) do
indeed dier substantially, as already reported in Table 1. What Table 1 does not indiate is
that, although the tehnial hange index has inreased to a large extent, dispersion has also
inreased remarkably, as reeted by muh more spread probability mass for (훾푠2/훽푠2)푇퐸퐶퐻
as ompared with 훾푠2,1995/훽푠2,1995. Finally, Figure 4. displays the distribution of 훾푠2/훽푠2 for
11
Figures and bandwidths obtained by alternative methods are available upon request. Results only diered
slightly.
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year 2000 alone, i.e., transition from Figure 4.b to Figure 4. reveals the eet of eieny
hange only. The patterns are very similar when evaluating the transitions from 2000 to 2005
(Figure 6.b), exept for the existene of ertain bimodality from 1995 to 2000 (Figure 4.b).
Therefore, the general trendindiating that dispersion is muh higher regarding tehnial
hangeis orroborated. It is also important to realize the importane of evaluating these
trends not only via the usual summary statistis (mean and standard deviation) but rather
examining the shape of the densities. Their analysis is important beause of their peuliarities,
showing that the eet of tehnial hange leads to its attening, espeially in the viinity of
the average.
Figure 5 and Figure 7 report similar information to that reported in Figure 4 and Figure
6, respetively. The main dierene is ontained in Figure 5.b and Figure 7.b, where the solid
lines indiate what the impat is on 훾푠2/훽푠2 of eieny hange only, i.e., we isolate the eet
on the distribution of 훾푠2/훽푠2 as if no tehnial hange existed. As indiated by both the
mean (solid vertial line) and the deformation of the distribution, it is learly detrimental, for
both 19952000 (Figure 5.b) and 20002005 (Figure 7.b) periods. The deline in the mean
value is lower than the mean inrease reported in Figure 4.b and Figure 6.b, and insinuates
that a positive eet over time ould prevail. However, as shown by Figure 4.a and 5.a, the
shapes of the distributions do not seem to dier a great deal.
The onlusions inferred from visually analyzing distributions an be reinfored via appli-
ation of the tests proposed in Setion 2 (Li, 1996, 1999; Simar and Zelenyuk, 2006). These
are reported in Table 3, whih orroborate results in gures 4 through 7. The 푝-values ob-
tained when testing the null 퐻0 : 푓 [(훾
푠2/훽푠2)푏] = 푔[(훾푠2/훽푠2)푐] indiates that the visual
dierenes found between distributions in the base (푏) and urrent (푐) periods are signiant
in all instanes. Therefore, the eets of tehnial hange and eieny hange onsidered
individually lead to signiant hanges in the shape of the densities, sine both of them are
statistially signiant at the most stringent signiane levels and for all omparisons (either
1995 vs. 2000, or 2000 vs. 2005).
5. Conluding remarks
In this artile we analyze the links between devolution and eieny of Spanish muniipalities
from a dynami perspetive, onsidering the evolution for two periods, namely, from 1995
to 2000, and from 2000 to 2005. These are relevant years in whih the Spanish eonomy
surged, and when some relevant initiatives for Spanish loal governments took plae. We
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onstrut a methodology based on the (deterministi) frontier prodution funtion literature
(Farrell, 1957; Afriat, 1972; Färe et al., 1994). Speially, we derived an indiator à la
Malmquist (Caves et al., 1982) whih allows us to measure whether eieny gains from
enhaned deentralization of powers have inreased over time. The indiator also deomposes
this time evolution in two omponents with spei eonomi meanings, in a similar fashion
to the Malmquist index whih deomposes produtivity hange into eieny hange and
tehnial hange.
We also onsider a sequential deomposition of the deentralization eonomies indiator in
the spirit of Kumar and Russell (2002). This deomposition allows us to asertain what the
most important omponent of the deentralization eonomies indiator iseither the tehnial
hange or the athing up omponent. We onsider that this methodology is important sine
results might vary a great deal aross loal governments, and applying this approah generates
results whih are not based on entral moments of the distribution only. In partiular, results
show that the eet of tehnial hange varies a great deal aross muniipalities, whereas
athing up is more homogeneous.
The appliation to Spanish loal governments is relevant for several reasons, among whih
we may highlight the debate on the hypothetial benets attainable from a seond deentral-
ization (that onsists of transferring powers not only from national to regional but also from
regional to the lowest level of government, i.e., muniipalities), and the response of munii-
palities to the new regulatory environment emerging after passing the law on the balaned
budget, whih is related to the European Stability and Growth Pat. Some reent trends
in the eonomy suh as the risis of the onstrution setor make it even more relevant to
analyze the Spanish ase, where powers related to urbanism are in hands of muniipalities.
Results show that, over time, benets for larger muniipalities (with more powers) are
inreasing, due to the relatively higher magnitude of the tehnial hange ompared to the
eieny hange index. However, dierenes are remarkable aross muniipalitiessome of
them perform very well, others trail behind. Deentralization eonomies, whih are the result
of the ombined eet of tehnial hange and eieny hange, have not improved on aver-
age, and this result is robust to the period under analysiseither 19952000 or 20002005.
In ontrast, eieny hange is lower, but dierenes among muniipalities are less stringent,
ontributing positively to redue disrepanies among muniipalities in the deentralization
index. These ndings ould be related to the trend experiened in most publi setor areas
before Spain's eonomy joined the Euro, whih followed the stipulations of the Maastriht
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Treaty on the sustainability of the government's nanial position. The ommitments of
Maastriht brought about a poliy of deit ontrol, boosting the demand for more eient
government and publi administration, and a White paper on the improvement of publi
servies. A new administration at the servie of itizens was released in 1999. These were
initiatives to reform publi administration, introduing many of the spei hanges in man-
agement pratie, inluded in the New Publi Management (NPM) (Pollitt, 2002) reipe, but
without being able to set o systemi hanges. Thus, although Spain has implemented many
of the ingredients of the NPM, there are still few visible benets. Our ndings, indiating
that remarkable dierenes exist between muniipalities, orroborate these laims. They also
onrm that trends dier for the two sample periods onsidered, although only slightly.
In line with the impliations pointed out by Worthington and Dollery (2000), our results
show tehnial progress together with negative eieny hange. This means that spei
deentralized muniipalities (those that operate eiently) might be innovating and taking
advantage of their new management praties. However, during the period we analyze the
spread of innovations does not our at the same pae (this duality is more evident in the
period 19952000 than in 20002005). The improvement in the level of deentralized munii-
palities' eieny will therefore depend more on the spread of existing innovations to ineient
muniipalitiesa kind of ontagion from the innovators to the ineient followersthan on
the searh of new experienes. This proess an be reinfored by disseminating among loal
governments those reforms that were introdued and have shown positive results.
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Table 1: Summary statistis for inputs and outputs, year
2005)
Inputs Median Std.Dev.
Total osts
a,b
(푇퐶) 669.999 441.280
Outputs
Population (푌1) 3,290.500 8,935.361
Number of lighting points
b
(푌2) 0.233 1.355
Tones of waste olleted

(푌3) 0.467 34.985
Street infrastruture surfae area
b,
(푌4) 51.966 41.255
Publi buildings surfae area
b,
(푌5) 0.028 1.784
Market surfae area
b,
(푌6) 0.002 3.077
Registered area of publi parks
b,
(푌7) 3.373 204.229
Assistane enters surfae area
b,
(푌8) 0.170 0.766
Quality (푌9) 2.283 0.315
# of observations 1,164
a
In thousands of 1995 pesetas (1 euro=166.386 pesetas).
b
Divided by population.
c
In square metres.
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Table 2: Perentage hange of bipartite deomposition indexes, seleted deiles
Index
10% deile 30% deile 50% deile 70% deile 90% deile
(median)
19952000
Change in deentralization eonomies 52.05 76.92 96.03 124.10 228.77
Tehnial hange 77.71 107.08 142.20 186.23 311.24
Eieny hange 29.73 52.78 70.11 93.01 153.80
20002005
Change in deentralization eonomies 34.49 71.59 89.51 113.07 162.87
Tehnial hange 48.65 86.07 112.98 153.77 270.30
Eieny hange 39.25 60.95 80.76 100 128.18
2
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Table 3: Distribution hypothesis tests, 1995 vs. 2000 vs. 2005 (Li, 1999; Simar and Zelenyuk, 2006)
Null hypothesis (퐻0)
푇 -test
statistis
푝-value
One-perent
signiane level
1995 vs. 2000
푓 [(훾푠2/훽푠2 )1995] = 푔[(훾푠2/훽푠2)2000] 3.827 0.002 퐻0 rejeted
푓 [(훾푠2/훽푠2 )1995] = 푔푇퐸퐶퐻 [푡푐× (훾푠2/훽푠2)1995] = 푔[(훾푠2/훽푠2)푇퐸퐶퐻 ] 6.854 0.000 퐻0 rejeted
푓 [(훾푠2/훽푠2 )1995] = 푔퐸퐹퐹 [푒푐× (훾푠2/훽푠2)1995] = 푔[(훾푠2/훽푠2)퐸퐹퐹 ] 20.488 0.000 퐻0 rejeted
2000 vs. 2005
푓 [(훾푠2/훽푠2 )2000] = 푔[(훾푠2/훽푠2)2005] 5.717 0.000 퐻0 rejeted
푓 [(훾푠2/훽푠2 )2000] = 푔푇퐸퐶퐻 [푡푐× (훾푠2/훽푠2)2000] = 푔[(훾푠2/훽푠2)푇퐸퐶퐻 ] 20.178 0.000 퐻0 rejeted
푓 [(훾푠2/훽푠2 )2000] = 푔퐸퐹퐹 [푒푐× (훾푠2/훽푠2)2000] = 푔[(훾푠2/훽푠2)퐸퐹퐹 ] 14.700 0.000 퐻0 rejeted
Notes: The funtions 푓(⋅) and 푔(⋅) are (kernel) distribution funtions for the atual deentralization eonomies
index in the urrent and base period, respetively; 푔푇퐸퐶퐻(⋅) and 푔퐸퐹퐹 (⋅) are ounterfatual distributions obtained
by adjusting the 1995 distribution of (훾푠2/훽푠2) for the eets of advanes in tehnology (푡푐) and advanes in
eieny (푒푐), respetively.
3
0
Figure 1: DEA vs. FDH frontier
  	 
 
 •

 
 • 
•  
• 


 •




fffi

fl


ffi
fffi

fl
fi

fl
  	 
 
PSfrag replaements
Density
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
0
1
2
3
(a) Atual distributions
 , - - - - ,
31
Figure 2: Senario 1. Deentralized muniipalities more eient than entralized munii-
palities
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Figure 3: Senario 2. Centralized muniipalities more eient than deentralized munii-
palities
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